In the course of his adventures, Keeper, the canine protagonist of a once-famous novel by children's writer Edward Augustus Kendall, meets an angry herd of oxen.
1 With short, dramatic sen tences focusing on Keeper's perceptions and fears, the narrative encourages readers to imagine themselves in his place: "They rushed furiously toward him. They lowered their heads as if in the act of butting. Keeper was now surrounded. Death seemed inevitable" (82). The dog manages to slip under one of the animals and flees over a frozen pool, only to sink into breaking ice. By the time he struggles free, more cattle await him on the other side. After a few tense moments, he escapes to the next field through a gap in the hedge. Keeper now "fancie[s] himself safe, " but further dangers evidently lurk round the corner (85).
In this scene, Kendall shows himself adept at the creation of what I call narrative sympathy: that is, a mode of fictional writing, increasingly common in the late eighteenth century, that encouraged readers to project themselves in imagination into another's situation, without losing sight of the distinc tion between self and other. Experimentation by novelists-from Henry Fielding's indirect access to and sceptical analysis of "the secret Springs, various Windings, and perplexed Mazes" of human life 2 to Samuel Richardson's use of the epistolary form to convey a sense of direct access to his character's sensations-had opened new avenues for exploring the human mind in fiction. Novelists such as Frances Burney, Ann Radcliffe, and Charlotte Smith were further developing the use of free indirect discourse and thought report to represent the mind at work.
What immediately distinguishes Kendall from these writers is that the fictional experiences he asks his readers to engage in belong to the world of non-human animals. Keeper's Travels (1798), his Kendall pioneered a distinctive kind of animal fiction in which sympathetic engagement with a non-human animal character is not reducible to simple anthropomorphism. As I will show, he combined his narrative sympathy with a close attention to descriptions of animal behaviour and animal cognition in recent works of natural history, inviting his readers to understand his animal characters as representatives of particular species, as well as feeling, experiencing individuals. Tension between these two aspects of his animals is sometimes evident, but it would over-simplify to present it as a difference between emotionally engaged narrative writing and the detached attitude of scientific natural history. Rather, tensions between similarity and difference, engagement and detachment, are internal to the narrative strategies he adopts, the philosophy on which these strategies are based, and the natural history on which he draws.
To take the narrative strategies first: Kendall, as noted above, wrote at a time when novelists were experimenting with ways of representing mental states and actions. At their best, they could move flexibly between creating the illusion of sharing a fictional character's sensations and inviting the reader to maintain sufficient detachment to reflect on, perhaps laugh at or criticize, that same character's mental operations. Authors took part in the creation of readerly empathy as described by critics such as Suzanne Keen and Alan Palmer. Palmer claims that "narrative fiction is, in essence, the presentation of fictional mental functioning, " the creation of characters' mental worlds, into which readers have access through their exercise of empathy: "the power of entering into another's personality and imaginatively experiencing their experiences ... is an essential part of the reading process. " 8 The modern term "empathy" now occupies some of the semantic ground claimed kendall's animal stories in the eighteenth century by "sympathy"; 9 in this article, I use the term "narrative sympathy" in preference to the term "empathy" to highlight the novel's use of concepts of sympathy derived from Adam Smith, and to suggest a tension within narrative, mirroring that in Smith's account, between identification with and separation from the object of sympathy.
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith considers sympathy as the imaginative process by which we place ourselves in another's situation. Using the example of our sensations when we see "our brother" tortured "upon the rack, " he writes that we cannot feel his pain through our own senses, but through an imaginative act: "by our imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. "
10 A radical identification with the other is qualified by the phrases "as it were" and "in some measure, " lending support to the view that for Smith, "sympathetic imagination does not dissolve the sense of separateness of either party. "
11 At times, Smith seems to envisage sympathy as a projection of our own feelings rather than an appreciation of another's. Imagination makes us feel grief on others' behalf for a situation they cannot themselves appreciate, for example if they have lost their reason (15) or if they are dead (16). Our sympathy with the dead arises "from our lodging ... our own living souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence conceiving what would be our emotions in this case" (16). At other points, in order to counter the charge that sympathy is a selfish principle, he insists on maintaining the distinction between the feelings of the one who sympathizes and those of the object of sympathy. When condoling with a parent who has lost a son, he is not merely (selfishly) considering how he himself would feel in that circumstance: "I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters. My grief ... is entirely upon your account" (374). Paradoxically, the very continuance of the distinction between the two parties here depends on imagination's power almost to overcome difference by allowing the sympathizer to "change persons and characters" with his object. This notion of imaginative identification with another who remains separate enables Smith to account for a man's sympathy with a woman's pains in childbirth, "though it is impossible that he should conceive himself as suffering her pains in his own proper person and character" (374).
Smith's notion of the imagination as letting the reader enter "as it were" into another's character forms a philosophical basis for contemporary novelists' experiments in readerly affect. Since imaginative acts, not necessarily the sight of real others, are concerned, sympathy can easily extend to fictional characters. In 1785, the novelist and critic Clara Reeve applied Smithian concepts to the reading process when she defined the novel as a relation of events "such as may happen to our friend, or to ourselves" in so realistic a way that "we are affected by the joys or distresses of the persons in the story, as if they were our own. "
12 What does Smithian imaginative sympathy mean, though, for Kendall's project of encouraging the child reader to be affected by the joys and distresses of dogs and birds? Smith himself, unlike his older contemporary David Hume, does not discuss cross-species sympathy or sympathy in non-human animals. Whereas Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1739) treats sympathy as an automatic transference of feeling from one body to another, exemplified in a dog's "howlings and lamentations" transferred to its fellows, and explicitly states that human sympathies can extend beyond our own species, 13 Smith, by concentrating on sympathy as a complex mental operation involving the postulation of hypothetical states, implies that it is an exclusively human activity. We might infer that the sympathy that can extend to imaginary characters might also extend to non-humans (at least fictional ones), but perhaps such a feeling would be, like sympathy with the dead in Smith's account, kendall's animal stories a case only of self-projection, "conceiving what would be our emotions" (16). Such a conclusion is encouraged by considering Kendall's animal stories as part of the subgenre of "it-narratives" or "circulation novels, " which related the adventures of banknotes and guineas as well as dogs, cats, and flies. Reviewers then, as well as scholars now, identified these narratives as a recognizable group in which animal and inanimate protagonists equally belonged as non-human objects given a fictional human character for the purposes of entertainment or satire. 14 In an important discussion of eighteenth-century literary negotiations of sympathy for animals and slaves, Markman Ellis concludes that animal narrators, just like inanimate ones, function as substitute human beings. It-narratives "no more try to think and feel like a dog or a pony than they do a wooden toy or a pincushion ... such narrators think and feel like humans. " While contending that dogs think, feel, and may have self-awareness, he nevertheless denies that imaginative narrative can approach any understanding of their minds: "the project of writing as a dog is absurd, a contradiction in terms, a fictional construction, as the supposed act of translation between dog-think and human language is not possible, no more possible than it would be to understand how a piece of wood thinks. That this is an uncrossable abyss is clear. " jane spencer operations resemble ours. 16 He emphasizes that animals have passions like our own (2.1.12, 324-28; 2.2.12, 397-98). David Hartley concurs with Hume, adding that these similarities ought to prompt human beings to treat animals kindly. 17 Writers such as Humphrey Primatt in a 1776 treatise and Thomas Young in a 1798 pamphlet that was praised in Keeper's Travels (iv) argue against cruelty to animals on the grounds of their susceptibility to pleasure and pain.
18 Several poets, notably James Thomson and William Cowper, invoke ani mals' feelings in order to arouse human sympathy for them. 19 Kendall draws on several aspects of this multi-faceted tradition. In the introduction to The Sparrow, he explains his narrative theory, based on the comparison of feeling across species:
In order that the child may understand the feelings of the creature, we propose that they should be compared with his own. With this intention we have, in the following pages, introduced a bird which, while we have attended to its nature and habits, we have, nevertheless, represented in such a manner that the child may consider him as a companion. We have sought to bring about an intimacy ... We have endeavoured, also, to set the sensations of the sparrow before the reader in such a way that he may acknowledge their relationship with his own: and to describe the events so that the child may interest himself in them as if they had befallen himself. We believe that whenever the reader enters thus into the fable, it will secure for itself a more certain and lasting influence than mere maxims can at any time obtain. An acquaintanceship is commenced: the relative situation of the parties is altered ... To cultivate those sympathies upon which benevolence is grafted, by shewing, ex exempla, how kendall's animal stories nearly all other animals resemble ourselves in their wants, pleasures, and natural faculties, the following pages were written. (x-xi)
The basis of Kendall's narrative technique in Smithian sympathy is clear. The bird is to become, in imagination, a "companion" related to the child and treated with "intimacy, " and the child is intended to respond to the story's events "as if they had befallen himself. " Yet the bird is more than an imaginary individual friend: it is the representative of a species whose "nature and habits" differ from those of human beings and are the object of a lesson in natural history. The difference that coexists with similarity is further discussed in Kendall's introduction to The Swallow. He admits that his fiction involves the falsity of fable and the attribution of non-existent powers to birds, but plans nevertheless to convey that truer, more naturalist understanding of animal life that he believes must lead to greater sympathy for them: "the author fre quently attributes faculties to his animals which would be useless in their sphere, and which suppose cultivation; here, assuredly, physical veracity is violated ... it is chiefly, however, by bringing animals forward in their real character, (a character pos sessed of certain portions of perception and memory, and the capacity of comparing ideas and acting in consequence) by becoming a voice to the dumb, that the author hopes to promote their benefit" (xiii-xiv). In various ways, Kendall's stories attempt to convey what he calls the "real character" of animals. In The Crested Wren, the bird protagonist, in fable fashion, has the power of speech, but uses it to explain differences between human and avian reasoning. With little idea of the future, the young birds have no worries when their family splits up: "we parted without design, and without troubling our selves by the idea of eternal, or even long, separation" (30). In Keeper's Travels, the dog has no verbal language, but can ex press sorrowful feelings shared by human and non-human alike: "those mournful plainings that want no words to render them intel ligible: that universal language which is every where under stood, by the inhabitant of every region, and by all orders of beings" (6-7).
Jonathan Lamb argues that the discourse of sympathy incorporated different degrees of attempt to identify with a radical, nonhuman other: where fictional characters, from Jonathan Swift's Gulliver in the eighteenth century to J.M. Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello in the twentieth century, identify with the non-human, Lamb argues that they court absurdity or the breakdown of language as they approach "the obliteration of all differences in a species of sympathy that proclaims the identity of the subject and the object. " 20 Such obliteration of difference is not Kendall's project. His attempts to convey an insight into how a non-human animal might feel correspond rather to what Lamb terms the third stage of a four-stage progression towards sympathetic identification, a stage he associates with Adam Smith's notion of the imagination as providing a bridge between different subjectivities. 21 We might think of Kendall as encouraging sympathy with his fictional animals by analogy, not with Smithian sympathy for the dead, where we impose what would be our own feelings on those who can no longer feel, but with Smith's account of a man's sympathy for a woman's childbirth pains. This cross-gender sympathy depends on a simultaneous sense of similarity (human beings of both sexes have similar bodies and feel similar pains) and difference (a man cannot feel precisely those particular pains). Kendall extends the consideration of similarity and difference, applied by Smith to sympathy within the human species, outward to encompass sympathies with other species. His stories attempt to find a fictional idiom for his understanding of non-human animal life: that in feeling and experience it is more similar to human existence than was usually acknowledged, and that the differences in perception and expression characteristic of particular species can be understood through a process of sympathetic engagement.
This attempt makes for a difference between Kendall's fiction and the typical it-narrative, which confers fictional personhood on its inanimate or non-human animal protagonists by the use of established narrative conventions for the presentation of human characters. Kendall tends to avoid or play down the most ob vi ously and artificially humanizing of these conventions, such as introducing the protagonist through relating his or her genealogy. Keeper kendall's animal stories the narrative plunges instead immediately into his experiences when, one market day, he loses his master: "his misery increased every moment ... he stood, now, forlorn, stripped, helpless, and unprotected ... he frequently fancied that he saw the object of his search ... he spent the greater part of the day in fruitless sallies" (3). It is true that in this attempt to convey the dog's feelings Kendall is dealing, in Ellis's words, with "fictional constructions, " but human minds in fiction are also constructions. Applying similar fictional techniques to the creation of human and non-human minds can have various results. It can be used, as Ellis suggests, to draw attention to the discrepancy between a narrator's ostensibly nonhuman viewpoint and its inevitably human characteristics, 23 or it may create an impression of similarity between the perspective and feelings of the human and the non-human animal. Kendall's fiction deploys fictional animal minds in both ways at different times, moving between the poles of similarity and difference in order to encourage awareness of and sympathy with the distinctive attributes of different species of animal.
His insight into non-human animals came from his knowledge of eighteenth-century natural history, including the writings of Buffon, Thomas Pennant, William Smellie, and Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, in whose work Kendall was particularly interested and whom he translated. Natural history feeds into most children's stories at this time, and Kendall presented himself as heir to Sarah Trimmer, Anna Laetitia Barbauld, Thomas Percival, John Aikin, and Maria Edgeworth, who had replaced the stunting, withering educational books of an earlier age with truth, philosophy, and "familiarity with the foundations and discoveries of science. "
24 His own stories are distinguished by the extent to which they replace the fabulists' concern for the lessons for human behaviour to be derived from a metaphorical reading of animal lives with the teaching of natural history for its own sake and for the sake of its direct moral benefits. His concern for what he calls animals' "real character" as opposed to the fictional identities they are given in fable comes from his reading in Buffon's accounts of the morphology, characteristics, and life cycles of different species. Turning away from old fables of bird life such as the story of the wren flying at the eagle, characterized by his narrator as the kind of 25 The crested wren of Kendall's title is Buffon's "Gold-Crested Wren," today com monly called a goldcrest (regulus regulus) and seen as closer to the warbler and tit families than to the wrens. 26 Thomas Pennant is cited on the migration of goldcrests from the Orkneys and on the taxonomy of hyenas. 27 The narrative of The Swallow turns on the migration of swallows and martins, still a subject of controversy among eighteenth-century naturalists, who argued over whether the birds flew to other countries or hibernated in caves or at the bottom of lakes. Kendall, through the character of the moralizing naturalist Mr Aylesford, comes down, like Buffon, on the side of migration to other countries (87-92), though he hedges his bets by having one young swallow survive the English winter in a "torpid sleep" under a roof (47) (48) . 28 Natural history informed Kendall's presentation of the muchdebated issue of animal intelligence. Buffon is generally unwilling to ascribe reasoning powers such as the comparison of ideas to animals, and emphasizes humanity's superior powers. 29 In the Natural History of Birds, however, it is reported that house sparrows "judiciously" alter their nesting habits according to situation, adding a roof when nesting in trees, but not when under cover: "instinct discovers here a sort of reasoning, and at least implies a comparison of two small ideas" (3:438-39). Kendall 25 30 Kendall cites Smellie on the similarity of animal and human minds in The Swallow. Commenting on the birds' clever nesting behaviour, he quotes directly from Smellie, providing a footnote to his source:
Instances of the variableness of the habits of animals, of their docility and sagacity, have always been considered as wonderful; but this wonder is partly the effect of inattention; for, though man is unques tionably the chief of the animal creation, the other animals, according to the mental powers with which nature has endowed them, comparatively approach to or recede from the sagacity and genius of the human species. The whole is a graduated scale of intelligence.* A philosopher should, therefore, contemplate and admire the whole; but should never be surprised at any partial exhibitions of the general scene of intellect and animation. *See Smellie's Philosophy of Natural History. (20-21) 31 Kendall presents natural history knowledge as the harmonious partner, indeed the source, of cross-species sympathy. His aim, he explains in the advertisement to The Swallow, is "to cultivate the knowledge, and consequent love, of Nature" (n.p.). His bird stories draw on naturalists' work for their central picture of parental affections. Buffon remarks on swallows as having particularly strong parental feelings, and tells the story of a mother bird who flew through flames to get to her nestlings (6:497). Kendall describes birds that die of cold because their migration was delayed by having to rebuild lost nests (39), and he cites Buffon as the authority for his description. Kendall's martins fail to leave because 30 See William Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History (Edinburgh, 1790):
"The notion that animals are machines, is perhaps too absurd to merit refutation. Though no animal is endowed with mental powers equal to those of man, yet there is not a faculty of the human mind, but evident marks of its existence are to be found in particular animals. Senses, memory, imagination, the principle of imitation, curiosity, cunning, ingenuity, devotion, or respect for superiors, gratitude, are all discoverable in the brute creation" (156-57). 31 The quotation is from Smellie, The Philosophy of Natural History, 459. Kendall omits a phrase after "the other animals": "according to the number of instincts, or, which amounts to the same thing. " jane spencer they are pining for their lost young, and his swallows because they will not leave their weak brood (39, [45] [46] , which adds further emphasis on avian feeling. The Swallow's account of the "desolated" martin parents whose nestlings are stolen by the foolish boy Edmund Eager is preceded by an epigraph from Thomson's Seasons describing the mourning of a mother nightin gale who finds her nest empty (22). 32 These lines were regu larly quoted in support of kindness to animals; at the same time, they are evidence of the strong interest in natural history for which Thomson was praised. 33 Poetic feeling for birds' affections was understood to coexist with scientific investigation of their characteristics.
The coexistence was sometimes uneasy, and Kendall's narrative creation of dog and birds as feeling individuals is sometimes at odds with his presentation of them as objects of scientific and philosophical knowledge. While his bird stories evoke sympathy for avian grief at the loss of young, he also remarks that a bird's death is (as a bereaved mother bird in The Sparrow says, with more than the usual narrative implausibility): "no evil: since it could only take away from us that of which we could never feel the loss" (73-74). This discrepancy is not so much the clash between a warmly engaged narrative sympathy and a coolly detached natural history as it is expressive of a tension within natural history itself. Natural historians, as Lorraine Daston has documented, were capable of developing strong attachments even to the individual insects that ab sorbed their prolonged close attention; 34 they also shot creatures in their thousands to build up a repository of knowledge. The sub ject of birds' parental feelings roused their sympathies, and there were many accounts of the wonderful instinct of affection im planted in them to enable them to bring up their young. These kendall's animal stories probably influenced William Smellie, when asking to be sent avian specimens for a projected museum, to request that shooting take place out of the nesting season to reduce cruelty; but then his collector's instincts overpowered him, and he indicated his desire for eggs and nests containing young as well.
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Such contradictory attitudes in natural historians can be seen as symptomatic of a struggle between the anthropocentric assumptions that they embraced like their contemporaries and the antianthropocentrism that was available at least as a theoretical attitude within the natural theology that strongly influ enced them. Keith Thomas describes the gradual "dethronement of man" from his self-appointed position at the centre of the world as one of the most significant philosophical innovations in modern Western thought. 36 Kendall provides amusing fables to underline the principle that, as the ornithologist John Ray pointed out a century previously, the beasts were not created solely for man's benefit.
37
The Canary Bird contains a swallow who, seeing its own species as the centre of the universe, deplores the cruelty of hawks. Kendall catches the idiom of the fictional convention of the lady of false sensibility when his swallow avers that it could never eat a bird itself: "independently of the cruelty of the deed, I should nauseate the dish" (20). Immediately afterward, the swallow decides to eat a "terrified" beetle, unmoved by the beauty of its "brilliant verdigris" wings, despite having cited the beauty of swallows as a reason not to kill them (21). The dialogue in which the swallow claims that beetles are created for its use, while the beetle declares the same of the smaller insects it eats, offers an anthropomorphic satire on anthro pocentrism, and a censure of the notion of a hierarchical scale of nature. "I grant you are a living thing, " sneers the bird, "but, infinitely low in the scale of beings when compared with swallows" (44) . The satire on human pride works in the traditional fabular manner, animal actions standing metaphorically for human ones; but Kendall claims a double purpose in the fable's conclusion that no creature can be blamed for predatory behaviour. The swallow realizes that "it is wrong to load any creature with reproach for doing what nature has directed ... in an enlarged point of view, a hawk is as innocent as a swallow" (47) . The narrator explains that he intends to teach "a natural, as well as a moral, truth ... to prove that all are innocent, I prove that all are guilty" (48) (49) . Even the human self-centredness that the narrative mocks is thus part of the natural order, a point further explicated in The Swallow by Mr Aylesford: "every species of creatures ... evinces an obvious preference to its own kind ... A philosophic mind will, in part, rise above this sensation, to which mankind, in common with brutes, is subject" (118-19). As Kendall's swallow and beetle fable indicates, he is interested not only in the natural historians' discussion of species' identity and characteristics, but also in a wider economy of nature. This is especially seen in his use of the work of Bernardin de SaintPierre. When The Sparrow's protagonist complains that birds are per secuted "like the poor outcast of India" (54), it is not just two ob jects of pity that are united (a typical way of linking animals with the poor in contemporary children's fiction) but two possessors of natural wisdom. The "poor outcast" refers to the pariah in Bernardin de Saint-Pierre's La Chaumière indienne, which Kendall had translated. 38 In this story of an English scientist travelling in search of enlightenment, the high-caste Brahmin is of no help, but the "Indian Paria" is truly wise. "Rejected by society, " he has "sought refuge in Nature" and made the transition recommended by natural theologians from loving nature to adoring its author (29, 28). kendall's animal stories create the subject's real significance. 39 Kendall brings some of this appreciation into his children's stories. All parts of creation, he writes in The Canary Bird, are interdependent and necessary, and "the extinction of a single species of birds, would derange the economy of the world" (71). In The Sparrow, he draws on Bernardin de Saint-Pierre's sixth Étude to argue that human beings should beware of exterminating so-called pests. When the Prussian peasants killed all the sparrows for eating grain, the har vests were ruined by insects whose numbers had previously been controlled by the birds (41-42). 40 Kendall's children's stories are infused with knowledge and ideas from various kinds of natural history. His combination of a natural historian's observation of animal life with narrative strategies designed to arouse sympathy produces, at times, a powerful imaginative rendition of animal sensation. The protagonist of The Crested Wren manages to describe and analyze its feelings when piled along with other birds in a bird-catcher's basket:
One of my wings was under the whole weight of another; one of my feet was forced into the beak of a bird, who bit it in expiring, which I was not able to withdraw; and the nails of another bird pierced my breast. The sensations of misery that I suffered were acute; but benevolent nature would not suffer them to be durable. There is a point at which every thing must stop; and pain and ruin have an end. In a little time my pulses seemed to cease; and by degrees a soft delirium took possession of what remained of 39 
Kendall, Beauties of the Studies of Nature: Selected from the Works of Saint
Pierre (London, 1799; rpt. New York: H. Caritat, 1799). In the first study, "Immensity of Nature, " Bernardin de Saint-Pierre explains that he thought to write a general history of nature but realized that he could not observe it all (43). He declares that he cannot even write a history of his own small strawberry plant growing in a pot in Paris because of the bewildering variety of beautiful insects that visit it: "Plants are the habitations of insects, and one cannot give the real history of a city without speaking of its inhabitants" jane spencer life. In this state, the mind does not altogether invent new, but rather distorts, newly colours, and changes the places of real cir cumstances. The warm and downy feathers of the dead and dying were, in my weak imagination, the nest in which I was born; the cries of the sufferers lost the bitterness of their anguish, and were only the little plainings of my brothers and sisters, for the return of our father and our mother. My nerves grew paralized, and were no longer tortured by the pressure of sharp claws, which I now fancied to be only the little feet of my brother. I heard their noises again: I looked out from the nest: I saw the forest, the lake, the swans upon its surface, the bright rising sun: I, too, was hungry: I uttered a little cry; but nature soon ceased to want: I believed that our parents returned, and I was satisfied. (55-57)
First-person narrative here combines philosophic observation with the "animals'-eye view" that Tess Cosslett has described in late eighteenth-century children's fiction. 41 The Crested Wren bears an epitaph from James Beattie's "Retirement, " which asks "Solitude" to protect an old pilgrim: "O guard from harm his hoary head / And listen to his lore. " 42 Kendall's altered version pleads instead for the reader to protect the goldcrest: "O! guard from harm his golden head, / And listen to his lore!" 43 This nicely encapsulates Kendall's technique of turning human into animal "lore." The story's opening puts Buffon's words into the bird's mouth, closely following the natural historian's text but switch ing viewpoint. Buffon's favourable description of the netting of goldcrests: "in autumn they are fat, and their flesh is delicate: during that season they are commonly caught by means of the call. The public markets of Nuremberg are then well stocked with these little birds" (Natural History of Birds, 5:370), becomes the crested wren's complaint that: "treachery frequently entraps us. Artificial calls invite us to the snare, and every autumn the shambles of Nuremberg are filled with gold-crested Wrens. Into this danger I was once betrayed" (The Crested Wren, 11). As well as Buffon's natural history, Kendall also uses some more fanciful accounts of bird behaviour, drawing on Johann Georg Keyssler for an account of a wild stork that believed a tame one was responsible for the shooting of one of its fellows, and brought a group of its friends back on successive kendall's animal stories occasions over two years to attack and finally kill the tame bird. 44 The story was frequently cited in the period as an example of the brute creation's powers of understanding; 45 Kendall expands on this interpretation, using the anecdote as evidence that birds communicate among themselves, plan together, feel for each other, and have powerful memories (49) . That this list of avian abilities is reeled off by a goldcrest responding to a sparrow's story shows the author enjoying the paradoxes inherent in his combination of talking-animal fable and natural history.
It is in the third-person narrative of Keeper's Travels that Kendall best develops his distinctive contribution to children's fiction with the creation of a sympathetic imagining of animal consciousness. Thought report is extensively used to create an impression of the dog's mind and encourage reader empathy with the animal's feelings. Particularly valued for its ability to render unspoken thoughts and unconscious and semi-conscious states of mind in human beings, 46 thought report is especially useful for fictional animals because it obviates the need to attribute human language to the animal character. The narrative simultaneously invites the reader to feel along with Keeper and to understand his mind in a way he cannot himself. Aspects of mind controversial in their attribution to animals, such as hope, fear, and intention, are easily, perhaps inevitably, given to a dog through whom a narrative is partly focalized. At the same time, the limitations of the dog's knowledge are dwelt on, adding to the impression that we are being given a window on the experience of a creature very different from ourselves: "he ran hastily along, without stopping to notice any thing, resolved to seek the house of a friend of his master, on whom they had called during their journey. This was considerably out of the direct homeward way, but here he hoped to find his master; and if he should not, still it was to him the only road: because the utmost of his knowledge, correct and surprising as it was, could only help to trace back the very steps he had trodden before" (13). When Keeper is wounded by a gunshot, the reader is invited not only to jane spencer imagine his sufferings, but also to do so with a canine body and mental perspective in view: "his sufferings increased his weariness, and overcome by their acuteness, he lay down under a hay-rick, and folded up his legs, curling his body round to protect himself from the blast. He would have slept, but the anguish he endured, denied him even a short respite from his sorrows. He lay pondering his condition: and if he anticipated no evils to come, the same ignorance of future events, which men sometimes inconsiderately envy, shut from him the hope of deliverance" (39-40). The reader is invited into Keeper's mind when he is in danger of dying in the snow. In line with his species' reputation for fidelity, Keeper in delirium thinks only of his master: "his wildered fancy cheered his expiring moments with the form, and features of his master. He fancied that this friend of his life was endeavouring to rescue him from his misery. He thought that his warm hand was on his neck. He thought that he dug away the perishing snow. The idea became still less distinct: he even thought himself relieved from his misery. He fancied himself in the arms of his master. He was happy. He was insensible" (135-36). In all this, Kendall's story can be seen as a forerunner of the empathetic accounts of animal life in fiction by Ernest Thompson Seton in Wild Animals I Have Known (1898) and Lives of the Hunted (1901), 47 and Jack London in The Call of the Wild (1903) and White Fang (1906) . 48 Kendall's choice of a dog as the subject of his most sustained attempt to render animal experience anticipates London's interest in the consciousness of dogs and wolves. White Fang has been described as an example of the most thorough kind of narrative attempt to "reproduce something like the texture or content or shape of nonhuman thought ... [in which] the narrating limits itself rigorously within the animal's natural and/or conventional sphere of interest and reference. " 49 Keeper's Travels is an early, less fully developed, experiment in a similar kind of narration. In the attention it pays to its dog protagonist's body positions, it can even be seen as an early movement in the direction of the phenomenological approach to understanding ani mal experience recently developed by ethnologists such as jane spencer Closer observation of canine behaviour mixes here with a hint of the Bildungsroman in the notion of young dog as maturing character. Equally, references to cross-species communication through body language and sympathy, present in the first edition, are developed in 1826 with more circumstantial detail. Wounded, Keeper takes refuge in a cottage, with whose mistress he soon establishes a rapport:
Trembling, not with present fear, but from his past ill-usage, and without moving from the couch which he had chosen, Keeper lifted his face to Nelly's, and his apology was instantly made, and mutual confidence inspired. Nelly was not afraid of a dog whose countenance told his benevolence, his humility, and his misery; and Keeper had no sooner caught the eyes of Nelly, than he felt that his appeal was allowed. Stooping down, and re-assuring him, by the tone of her voice, Nelly soon permitted herself to pat his head, and to endeavour to examine his wounds: but from this latter office the pain made him shrink, in a manner that forbade its continuance, while he licked, however, the hand that was thus beneficently extended to him. (KT [1826] , [78] [79] This quiet reciprocal exchange presents the dog as a character integrated within a piece of early nineteenth-century sentimental domestic fiction.
By the 1820s, thought report and free indirect discourse in fiction were more extensively used, and the influence of recent narrative developments are apparent in the 1826 edition's expansive rendering of the dog's thoughts when he loses his master:
Room was there for hope, and hope, therefore, was not long in returning. Had he finally lost his master through this very mistake of his person? Had he left him behind, when he idly thought that he saw him travelling before? Here were new subjects of alarm, but new occasions, also, for hope. In proportion as these thoughts shot across Keeper's mind, his howl of despair was exchanged for a bark of eagerness. His limbs equally with his voice, moved with his thoughts. ... At first, confident in the new prospect of discovery which he had created, he ran with all his might; anon, inward misgivings slackened his pace. Then, hopes a second time revived, medi ta tions on possibilities, thoughts of places yet unvisited, or believed to have been unvisited, or not examined with sufficient care; these brought his feet into a somewhat even, though generally hurried step, and it was amid this variety of feeling that Keeper regained the market-place. (KT [1826] , 10-11)
The rapid fluctuation of thought and feeling, the indirect rendition of the character's internal monologue, and the alignment of mental experience with bodily expression, are all features of the detailed narrative examination of human minds characteristic of early nineteenth-century fiction, and perfected especially in Jane Austen. Kendall's representations of Keeper's mind sometimes read like simpler versions of the multi-layered renditions of human thought and feeling in, for example, Emma. Keeper's ready access to renewed hope is not unlike Mr Weston's "sanguine temper, " which "soon flies over the present failure, and begins to hope again, " 52 while the dog protagonist shares with Emma herself the tendency to ask himself indirectly reported internal questions. 53 A succession of thoughts is said to have "shot across Keeper's mind, " in rather the same way as the conviction that Mr Knightley must marry her "darted through" Emma (320). Keeper's inward fluctuations are expressed in changes of bodily movement: misgivings slacken his pace, revived hopes speed it up. A similar alignment of mental and physical activity occurs in Emma when the protagonist is agitated by the thought that she may have inadvertently promoted a marriage between Mr Knightley and Harriet: "How to understand it all! How to understand the deceptions she had been thus practising on herself, and living under!-The blunders, the blindness of her own head and heart!-she sat still, she walked about, she tried her own room, she tried the shrubbery" (323-24); and "what could be increasing Emma's wretchedness but the reflection never far distant from her mind, that it had been all her own work? ... she was not able to refrain from a start, or a heavy sigh, or even from walking about the room for a few seconds" (332).
These comparisons are not offered in order to suggest the direct influence of Austen on Kendall, still less that his rendering of mental life approaches anywhere near the subtlety of her media tion between sympathetic engagement and detached comment. Rather, they indicate something of the direction in which fictional rendering of minds had moved by the time Kendall revised his work, and illustrate some of the techniques on which novelists after Austen were drawing. Kendall's achievement is to apply such techniques to the representation of a dog's mind, while carefully attending to its canine character. Keeper's questions to himself about how he lost his master may strike a modern reader as pure anthropomorphism, but if we take them as thought report's verbal representation of non-verbal mental activity, they are quite in line with Hume's view in the Treatise that dogs can reason simply and learn from experience (1.3.16, 177-78). Keeper's canine nature is equally evident in the howls and barks that shooting thoughts produce in him, as opposed to the reflections and speeches produced in Emma. At the same time, the two authors' shared empha sis on the bodily movements sparked by mental shifts can serve to remind us that Austen herself recognizes an "animal" correspondence of mind and body in her human characters.
Kendall drew on Humean analogies between human and nonhuman mental life, breaking down the barriers between them to establish a dog's potential to be a fictional character under realistic conventions while remaining a dog. In his hands, children's fiction was at the forefront of developing fictional technique at a time when novelists were deepening their approach to representing the mind. The latest discoveries of natural historians played an important part in his narrative innovations. While the debate about animal mind continued, for readers of children's fiction it was settled in favour of the animals. Stories centering on animal experience and approaching animals as characters with all the new fictional resources developed for the creation of fic tional mind in human beings necessarily gave the impression that mind was an animal attribute too. In Kendall's work, this view was not conveyed with the obvious anthropomorphism of those later animal stories whose protagonists dress and live like human beings, but with a combination of a natural historian's interest in the cognition and behaviour of different species, and a novelist's interest in rendering those characteristics with narrative sympathy.
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